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CASENOTE

Calling on the Legislature: Dixon v. State
and Georgia's Statutory Scheme to Protect
Minors from Sexual Exploitation
In Dixon v. State,1 the Georgia Supreme Court analyzed Georgia's
statutory scheme to protect children from sexual exploitation.2 A jury
convicted Marcus Dixon of statutory rape and aggravated child
molestation, for which he received the mandatory minimum sentence of
fifteen years to serve ten.3 The Georgia Supreme Court reversed
Dixon's conviction for aggravated child molestation.4 As a result of the
reversal, Dixon was released from prison because he had already served
the requirements for his statutory rape conviction.5 The majority and
concurring opinion urged the Legislature to clarify Georgia's statutes to
expressly distinguish statutory rape from child molestation. 6 The
dissenting opinions argued that "no legal justification whatsoever"
existed for the reversal of Dixon's conviction, and a once clear statutory
scheme to protect children from exploitation was clouded by the

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

278 Ga. 4, 596 S.E.2d 147 (2004).
Id. at 5, 596 S.E.2d at 148.
Id. at 4 n.1, 596 S.E.2d at 148 n.1.
Id. at 4, 596 S.E.2d at 148.
Id. at 8, 596 S.E.2d at 151.
Id. at 9, 596 S.E.2d at 151 (Hunstein, J., concurring).
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majority.7 This Note argues that future courts will not hold the Dixon
opinion expanded the scope of the rule of lenity because either: (1) the
use of the rule of lenity was dicta, or (2) the rule of lenity, as used in
Dixon, only applies to situations where the Legislature clearly intended
for misdemeanor punishment to apply.

I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Marcus Dixon, a highly recruited football player and honor student,
planned to attend Vanderbilt University on an athletic scholarship.
During his senior year at Pepperrell High School in Dalton, Georgia,
Dixon admitted he had sexual intercourse with a sophomore student in
one of the school's classroom trailers. Dixon was eighteen years old at
the time; the girl was fifteen years old. Dixon maintained the act was
consensual, and the victim fabricated the rape accusation because she
feared what her father would do if he discovered his daughter had
intercourse with an African-American. s
The victim testified that after school Dixon approached her in the
trailer, locked the door, and forced her to have sex with him. Specifically, the victim introduced evidence of vaginal injuries and a bruised
arm.9 The defense argued that the "slight" vaginal injuries were not
caused by force and were incidental to sexual intercourse. Dixon denied
causing the bruises on the victim's arm.1 ° The testimony of two
additional witnesses was also admitted for the "limited purpose of
illustrating [Dixon's] intent, motive or bent of mind in engaging in the
act of intercourse with the 15-year old."" One young woman testified
Dixon had exposed himself to her, and another testified Dixon had
placed his hands inside her underwear.'2
On May 15, 2003, a jury found Dixon guilty of statutory rape and
aggravated child molestation, but acquitted him of all other charges
including rape, sexual battery, false imprisonment, and aggravated
assault.13 As required by Georgia's mandatory sentencing laws, Dixon

7. Id. at 12, 596 S.E.2d at 156 (Carley and Thompson, JJ., dissenting).
8. Brief for Appellant at 2-5, Dixon v. State, 278 Ga. 4, 596 S.E.2d 147 (2004) (No.
S04A0072).
9. Dixon, 278 Ga. at 9, 596 S.E.2d at 154 (Carley and Thompson, JJ., dissenting).
10. Brief for Appellant at 3, Dixon (No. S04A0072).
11. Dixon, 278 Ga. at 10, 596 S.E.2d at 155 (Carley and Thompson, JJ., dissenting).
12. Id. (Carley and Thompson, JJ., dissenting).
13. Id. at 4 n.1, 596 S.E.2d at 148 n.1.
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years to serve ten for the aggravated child
received a sentence of fifteen
14
molestation conviction.
A large amount of media coverage surrounded the case and sentencing.15 An outcry ensued claiming the sentence was unjust because
Dixon was found not guilty of rape, sexual battery, false imprisonment,
and aggravated assault.16 Because Dixon was acquitted of rape and
sexual battery, many felt the jury's verdict proved that the sexual
encounter was consensual. 7 However, Dixon's appeal did not allege
that the verdict proved the act was consensual, but rather that Georgia's
Legislature could not have intended for a teenager to serve a minimum
of ten years in prison for non-rape intercourse with another teenager."
On September 2, 2003, Dixon filed a Notice of Appeal to the Georgia
Supreme Court invoking jurisdiction by challenging the constitutionality
of the aggravated child molestation statute. 19 On May 3, 2004, Dixon's
conviction for aggravated child molestation was reversed, and he was
released from prison having completed his sentence for misdemeanor
statutory rape.20
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

Statutory Rape
Statutory Rape in Georgia is a strict liability crime, and the State
must prove only that the defendant engaged in sexual intercourse with
a person under the age of sixteen.2' The relationship between the age
of the defendant and victim can cause statutory rape, a felony, to be
reduced to a misdemeanor. 22 Section 16-6-3(a) of the Official Code of
Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.") 23 governs statutory rape, and a person
is guilty of a felony "when he or she engages in sexual intercourse with

A.

14. Id. at 4, 596 S.E.2d at 148.
15. Articles and editorials appeared in the New York Times and Washington Post. The
Oprah Winfrey Show and HBO's Real Sports also featured pieces on the trial.
16. Courtland Milloy, MarcusDixon Doesn'tBelong in Ga. Prison,WASH. POST, Jan. 25,
2004, at CI.
17. Dixon, 278 Ga. at 4, 596 S.E.2d at 148. This was a flawed argument because being
found not guilty only means the state failed to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
18. Brief for Appellant at 29, Dixon (No. S04A0072).
19. Dixon, 278 Ga. at 4 n.1, 596 S.E.2d at 148 n.1.
20. Id. at 4, 596 S.E.2d at 147.
21. Dixon, 278 Ga. at 4, 13, 596 S.E.2d 147, 152 (2004) (Hines, Carley, and Thompson,
JJ., dissenting).
22. Dixon, 278 Ga. at 5, 596 S.E.2d at 148.
23. O.C.G.A. § 16-6-3(a) (2003).
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any person under the age of 16 years" who is not his or her spouse.
However if "the victim is 14 or 15 years of age and the person so
convicted is no more than three years older than the victim," then the
defendant will be guilty of a misdemeanor rather than a felony.25 The
misdemeanor provision prevents teenagers who engage in consensual sex
and are not
more than three years apart in age from being charged with
26
a felony.
In 1995 the Georgia Legislature added the misdemeanor provision and
gave the trial judge discretion to sentence a teenager guilty of statutory
rape to either a felony or a misdemeanor.2 ' However, in 1996 the
Legislature again amended O.C.G.A. section 16-6-3 to specifically
eliminate any discretion a trial judge may have in sentencing a
defendant to a felony or a misdemeanor.2 ' The 1996 amendment
mandated one will only be guilty of a misdemeanor when certain age
factors are established.29
Both the 1995 and 1996 amendments are consistent with laws in other
states and recognize that two teenagers engaging in consensual sex
should not be subject to felony prosecution. 0 Some states, such as
Arkansas, Iowa, and Colorado, have enacted statutory rape laws that
only criminalize sexual activity when a defendant is a specified number
of years older than the victim. 3 1 Other states, like Georgia, California,
and Ohio, prevent a defendant from being charged with a felony when
certain age factors are present.32 Regardless of the approach taken,
either to totally decriminalize or to reduce the punishment to a
misdemeanor, the majority of states have laws to differentiate sexual
activity between teenagers from
sexual activity between a much older
33
defendant and a minor victim.
B.

Child Molestation and Aggravated Child Molestation

Child molestation is not a strict liability crime and requires the State
to prove the defendant engaged in "any immoral or indecent act to or in
the presence of or with any child under the age of 16 years with the

24. Id.
25. Id. § 16-6-3(b).
26. Id.
27. Dixon, 278 Ga. at 5-6, 596 S.E.2d at 148-49.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Amicus Brief on Behalf of The Children's Defense Fund at 13-16, Dixon v. State,
278 Ga. 4, 596 S.E.2d 147 (2004) (No. S04A0072).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the
person."34 Aggravated child molestation occurs when one "commits an
offense of child molestation which act physically injures the child or
involves the act of sodomy."35 A person convicted of aggravated child
molestation is subject to the sentencing requirement under O.C.G.A.
section 17-10-6.1, s" and the defendant must serve a minimum of ten
years in prison. 7 Unlike statutory rape, the Legislature has not
passed any amendments to reduce child molestation or aggravated child
molestation to a misdemeanor depending on the age of the defendant
and the victim.
III.

COURT'S RATIONALE

Chief Justice Fletcher, writing for the majority, held that the
Legislature intended to punish Dixon's conduct as misdemeanor
statutory rape rather than felony child molestation; therefore, the court
The
reversed Dixon's conviction for aggravated child molestation."
decision consisted of three major parts. First, the court determined how
the Legislature intended to treat the conduct that occurred in this
case.3" After concluding the Legislature intended to punish Dixon's
conduct as a misdemeanor, the court used several canons of statutory
interpretation to support its argument that only misdemeanor statutory
rape applied.4 0 Second, the court specifically responded to the State's
contention 41 that the statutory construction analysis was not applicable
in this case. Finally, the court encouraged the Legislature to make

34. O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4(a) (2003).
35. Id. § 16-6-4(c).
36. O.C.G.A. § 17-10-6.1 (2003). The only crimes applicable to O.C.G.A. section 17-106.1 are: (1) murder or felony murder, as defined in O.C.G.A. section 16-5-1; (2) armed
robbery, as defined in O.C.G.A. section 16-8-41; (3) kidnapping, as defined in O.C.G.A.
section 16-5-40; (4) rape, as defined in O.C.G.A. section 16-6-1; (5) aggravated child
molestation, as defined in O.C.G.A. section 16-6-4; (6) aggravated sodomy, as defined in
O.C.G.A. section 16-6-2; or (7) aggravated sexual battery, as defined in O.C.G.A. section 166-22.2 Id. A conviction of any crime listed in O.C.G.A. section 17-10-6.1 requires that the
defendant serve a minimum often years in prison. Id. Section 17-10-6.1 was amended in
1998 and prevents a defendant from entering a first offender sentencing program when
convicted of one of the these crimes. Dixon, 278 Ga. at 11, 596 S.E.2d 155 (Carley, J.,
dissenting).
37. O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4(d)(1) (2003).
38. Dixon, 278 Ga. at 4, 596 S.E.2d at 148.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 5, 596 S.E.2d at 148-49.
41. A view shared by the dissent.
42. Dixon, 278 Ga. at 7-8, 596 S.E.2d at 150.
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a more recognizable distinction between statutory rape, child molestation, and other sexual crimes, especially with respect to teenage
defendants.4 3
Georgia Legislature's Intent and Canons of Statutory Construction
The majority's decision stated statutory rape and child molestation
were part of a legislative framework and coordinated scheme aimed at
"protecting children from sexual exploitation."44 Using the statutory
canon in pari materia, the court stated the statutes in question must be
construed together to determine how the Legislature intended to punish
Dixon's conduct. 45 To properly use the canon in pari materia, the court
4
must determine that the statute is ambiguous. " According to the
court, reading the two statutes together showed "a clear legislative
intent to prosecute the conduct that the jury determined to have
47
occurred in this case as misdemeanor statutory rape." The majority
used several canons of construction to support its position that the
Legislature only intended to punish Dixon for misdemeanor statutory
rape.48
First, the 1996 amendment to the statutory rape law provided that if
certain age factors were present, statutory rape was punishable only as
a misdemeanor.49 When a defendant was convicted of statutory rape,
the trial judge is not able to choose whether to sentence the defendant
to either a misdemeanor or a felony.5 ° The majority stated "it would be
entirely incongruous with the intent of the Legislature" to mandate
conduct under O.C.G.A. section 16-6-3 to be a misdemeanor if the exact
same conduct could meet felony child molestation.5 ' Thus, the Legisla-

A.

43. Id. at 8, 596 S.E.2d at 150-51.
44. Id. at 4-5, 596 S.E.2d at 148.
45. Id. See Butterworth v. Butterworth, 227 Ga. 301, 304, 180 S.E.2d 548, 552 (1971)
(determining that the canon of in pari materia requires that a statute must be construed
in relation to other statutes of which it is a part).
46. See Butterworth, 227 Ga. at 304, 180 S.E.2d at 552 (stating "in pari materia may
not be resorted to where the language of the statute under consideration is clear, it is
equally as well settled that, where the terms of the statute to be construed are ambiguous
or its significance is of a doubtful character, it becomes necessary to give proper
consideration to other related statutes").
47. Dixon, 278 Ga. at 5, 596 S.E.2d at 148.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 5-6, 596 S.E.2d at 149.
50. Brief for Appellant at 10, Dixon v. State, 278 Ga. 4, 596 S.E.2d 147 (2004) (No.
S04A0072) (arguing a defendant could be found guilty of numerous felonies such as rape,
aggravated assault, and sexual battery if forcible or nonconsensual intercourse were found
to occur).
51. Dixon, 278 Ga. at 6, 596 S.E.2d at 149.
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ture intended for the misdemeanor statutory rape provision to have
exclusive application to conduct falling within its parameters, and "[i]f
the conduct at issue in this case also qualifies as child molestation, then
...any instance of sex between teenagers would also constitute child
molestation."5 2 This would be the case because consensual sex between
unmarried teenagers, which normally is classified as misdemeanor
statutory rape, also satisfies the elements of child molestation." When
the Legislature amended the statutory rape provision in 1996 to require
a misdemeanor sentence in certain situations, the Legislature did not
intend for the same act to be punishable as a felony under the child
molestation statute.54
A second independent reason to support the Legislature's intent to
punish Dixon for misdemeanor statutory rape was based on the canon
of statutory construction that states absent contrary legislative intent,
a specific statute will prevail over a general statute.5 5 In Dixon the
statutory rape provision was more specific than the child molestation
provision because statutory rape contained guidelines governing the
activity of teenagers.5 6 This canon of statutory construction showed the
Legislature's intent to punish sex between teenagers who are not more
than three years apart in age exclusively under the misdemeanor
statutory rape provision.57 The majority cited to previous decisions
that applied this cannon of construction and held "where a crime is
penalized by a special law, the general provisions of the penal code are
not applicable.""
Third, the majority concluded misdemeanor statutory rape should
apply based on the canon of statutory interpretation that states when
two statutes conflict, the most recent expression of the Legislature shall
prevail. 9 The most recent modification by the Legislature on sexual
acts between teenagers was the 1996 amendment of O.C.G.A. section 166-3, which removed a trial judge's discretion to sentence a person guilty
of statutory rape to either a felony or a misdemeanor when certain age

52. Id.
53. Unlike statutory rape, child molestation is not a strict liability crime; one of the
elements that must be proved is an "indecent or immoral act." The majority seems to
imply that consensual sex between unmarried minors is an indecent or immoral act.
54. Dixon, 278 Ga. at 6, 596 S.E.2d at 149.
55. Id., 596 S.E.2d at 150.
56. Id. at 6-7, 596 S.E.2d at 149-50.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 6 n.10, 596 S.E.2d at 149 n.10 (quoting Gee v. State, 225 Ga. 669, 676, 171
S.E.2d 291, 296 (1969)).
59. Id. at 7, 596 S.E.2d at 150.

784

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56

factors were present.60 The majority held the misdemeanor statutory
rape provision, which was amended more recently, must prevail over the
felony child molestation statute. 1
Finally, the majority reasoned the rule of lenity required that Dixon
only be sentenced to a misdemeanor because the child molestation
statute conflicted with the statutory rape statute, and uncertainty
existed as to which statute should apply. 2 Under the rule of lenity,
when reasonable minds might disagree on the Legislature's intent, a
criminal defendant is entitled to the interpretation that imposes the
more lenient sentence. 3 Because the same conduct can result in
drastically different penalties depending on which statute is applied,
Dixon was entitled to the lesser of the two penalties.64
B.

Response to Argument that Statutory ConstructionHas No Merit
The majority addressed the State's argument that because Dixon was
convicted of aggravated child molestation, and not just child molestation,
the canons of statutory construction were not relevant. 5 The majority
reasoned that child molestation must be proven as an element of
aggravated child molestation. 6 Several canons of statutory construction indicate that the Legislature intended Dixon's conduct to be
misdemeanor statutory rape and not child molestation. Thus, Dixon
could not possibly be convicted of aggravated child molestation because
he could not be guilty of child molestation. 7
C. Calling on the Legislature
The majority encouraged the Legislature to make a more recognizable
distinction between statutory rape and child molestation in order to
clarify the type of conduct that necessitates the minimum ten-year

60. The dissent argued that the Legislature's amendment of O.C.G.A § 17-10-6.1 in
1998 was the most recent action in this area. Id. at 11, 596 S.E.2d at 155 (Carley and
Thompson, JJ., dissenting).
61. Dixon, 278 Ga. at 7, 596 S.E.2d at 150.
62. Id. The majority's use of the rule of lenity seems to conflict with the reasoning
given earlier in the opinion. Previously in the opinion, the majority stated that the
Legislature clearly intended to punish Dixon's conduct as misdemeanor statutory rape.
However, when addressing the rule of lenity, the majority states that an uncertainty exists
as to which statute applies. Compare Dixon, 278 Ga. at 7, 596 S.E.2d at 150, with Dixon,
278 Ga. at 5, 596 S.E.2d at 149.
63. Id. at 7, 596 S.E.2d at 150.

64. Id.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 7-8, 596 S.E.2d at 150.
Id.
Id.
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The
sentence that accompanies aggravated child molestation. 8
majority noted that as O.C.G.A. section 16-6-4 is now written, "teenagers
could be convicted of aggravated child molestation.., if they willingly
engage in sexual activity ...so long as one experienced slight pain or
received even minor injuries incidental to the act."6 9 The majority's
decision was based on the Legislature not intending to sentence
teenagers to prison for ten years in such situations.7"
D.

ConcurringOpinion: Justice Hunstein

Justice Hunstein expanded on three points contained in the majority
opinion. 71 First, through statutory interpretation one could conclude
that the Legislature clearly did not intend to impose felony punishment,
and the accompanying ten-year minimum sentence, for consensual
sexual intercourse between teenagers. 72 The Legislature intended
felony punishment only for sexual predators, regardless of their age,
convicted of child molestation and aggravated child molestation. v Yet,
as the majority correctly noted, O.C.G.A. sections 16-6-3 and 16-6-4
conflict, and any conflict must be construed in favor of Dixon.74 Second,
Justice Hunstein determined that the decision reached by the majority
was not based on Dixon's acquittal on the rape and sexual battery
charge.7 5 The acquittals only showed the State failed to prove the
charges beyond a reasonable doubt and not that the sexual encounter
was consensual.7 6 Third, the concurring opinion urged the Legislature,
"in the strongest possible terms," to clarify the laws governing statutory
rape and child molestation so felony punishment
is only available to
7

those who "prey upon other children."

E. Dissent: Justice Hines joined by Justice Carley and Justice
Thompson

The dissent claimed the majority made several errors. First, even if
O.C.G.A. sections 16-6-3 and 16-6-4 were part of a coordinated scheme,

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 8, 596 S.E.2d at 150-51.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 8, 596 S.E.2d at 151 (Hunstein, J., concurring).
Id. at 8-9, 596 S.E.2d at 151 (Hunstein, J., concurring).
Id. (Hunstein, J., concurring).
Id. (Hunstein, J., concurring).
Id. (Hunstein, J., concurring).
Id. (Hunstein, J., concurring).
Id. (Hunstein, J., concurring).
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the Legislature created two separate and distinct crimes. 78 The
majority incorrectly approached the statutes as if they were "one and the
same."7 According to the dissenting justices, each crime had its own
distinct elements and no conflict existed between O.C.G.A. sections 16-63 and 16-6-4.s° When the Legislature amended the statutory rape
statute to incorporate discretionary misdemeanor punishment when
certain age factors were established, the punishment for aggravated
child molestation was increased." The Legislature failed to incorporate
a similar age restriction for child molestation. 2 Thus, the 1995 and
1996 amendments to laws governing sex crimes did not show an
intention to consider child molestation and statutory rape as one
crime. 83
The second critique offered by the dissent was that the majority failed
to recognize that statutory rape was a lesser included offense of
aggravated child molestation. 4 Merger of crimes occurs when one
offense is "established by the same but less than all the facts required
to establish another offense." 5 In the Dixon case, injury was needed
to establish aggravated child molestation, but injury was not needed to
prove statutory rape.8 ' The crimes were not identical and did not
merge together because the statutory rape conviction could stand
without showing injury.87 Dixon was only sentenced for the aggravated
child molestation charge because statutory rape was a lesser included
offense.88 An injustice did not occur because sufficient evidence existed
Additionally, the
for the aggravated child molestation charge. 9
majority's discussion of the rule of lenity was inappropriate because
statutory rape and aggravated child molestation were not proved by the
exact same facts. 90 The concept of lesser included offenses, not the rule
of lenity, governs when the evidence needed to prove each offense
differs.9

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 12, 596 S.E.2d at 151 (Hines, Carley, and Thompson, JJ,, dissenting).
Id. (Hines, Carley, and Thompson, JJ., dissenting).
Id. (Hines, Carley, and Thompson, JJ., dissenting).
Id. at 14, 596 S.E.2d at 152-53 (Hines, Carley, and Thompson, JJ., dissenting).
Id., 596 S.E.2d at 151-52 (Hines, Carley, and Thompson, JJ., dissenting).
Id. (Hines, Carley, and Thompson, JJ., dissenting).
Id., 596 S.E.2d at 153 (Hines, Carley, and Thompson, JJ., dissenting).
Id. (Hines, Carley, and Thompson, JJ., dissenting).
Id. (Hines, Carley, and Thompson, JJ., dissenting).
Id. (Hines, Carley, and Thompson, JJ., dissenting).
Id. (Hines, Carley, and Thompson, JJ., dissenting).
Id. (Hines, Carley, and Thompson, JJ., dissenting).
Id. (Hines, Carley, and Thompson, JJ., dissenting).
Id. (Hines, Carley, and Thompson, JJ., dissenting).
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The dissent also argued that the majority misconstrued the evidence
offered at trial and summarily dismissed the harm suffered by the victim
as "slight."92 However, the reasoning used by the majority would have
reversed the conviction even if horrific injuries had occurred.93 Based
on the majority opinion, the dissent argued that if the conduct met the
statutory rape requirement, then regardless of the injuries suffered, the
State could not charge a defendant with child molestation because of the
rule of lenity.' Because child molestation is an element of aggravated
child molestation, the State could only charge a defendant with statutory
rape if certain age factors were present.95
The dissent concluded that the statutory rape and aggravated child
molestation statutes were not in conflict before the majority's opinion.9 6
The reason the majority encouraged the Legislature to clarify these
statutes was because the majority, and not the Legislature, clouded and
confused the law.97
Dissent: Justice Carleyjoined by Justice Thompson
Justice Carley wrote a separate dissent to express additional
observations on how the majority erred.9" Justice Carley also agreed
that the majority's decision clouded once clear statutes governing
statutory rape and aggravated child molestation.99 Justice Carley
argued that the majority's reasoning was based on its belief that the
fifteen year old girl "was a willing partner in the sexual act, rather than
a victim who was injured by Dixon's sexual aggression."' 0 However,
it was not appropriate for an appellate court to make determinations
based on the credibility of a witness.'0 ' Because there was sufficient
evidence to support the jury's finding of aggravated child molestation,
"no legal justification whatsoever" existed for reversing the convic1 2
tion. 0
F

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. at 15, 596 S.E.2d at 153 (Hines, Carley, and Thompson, JJ., dissenting).
Id. (Hines, Carley, and Thompson, JJ., dissenting).
Id. at 15-16, 596 S.E.2d at 153-54 (Hines, Carley, and Thompson, JJ., dissenting).
Id. (Hines, Carley, and Thompson, JJ., dissenting).
Id. (Hines, Carley, and Thompson, JJ., dissenting).
Id. at 16, 596 S.E.2d at 154 (Hines, Carley, and Thompson, JJ., dissenting).
Id. at 9, 596 S.E.2d at 154 (Carley and Thompson, JJ., dissenting).
Id. (Carley and Thompson, JJ., dissenting).
Id.at 11-12, 596 S.E.2d at 156 (Carley and Thompson, JJ., dissenting).
Id. (Carley and Thompson, JJ., dissenting).
Id. (Carley and Thompson, JJ., dissenting).
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Justice Carley further noted that sufficient evidence existed to show
Dixon was a sexual predator. 10 3 One witness testified that Dixon had
previously exposed himself to her, and another witness testified that
Dixon had placed his hands down her underwear.' 4 Such evidence
was sufficient for a jury to find Dixon was a "teenage sexual predator[]
who prey[s] on other children," but it was not the role of the Georgia
Supreme Court to conclude whether or not the jury classified Dixon as
a predator." 5 An appellate court can
only determine if sufficient
0 6
evidence existed to uphold a conviction.

IV. IMPLICATIONS

Both the majority and dissent agree that Legislative action is needed
to clarify Georgia's laws dealing with the sexual exploitation of
children."' The majority suggests that the laws governing statutory
rape and child molestation, as currently written, conflict with each other,
and the Legislature should make a more recognizable distinction
between the crimes.0 8 The dissent believes that the laws, as written,
are clear and unambiguous, but the majority's opinion clouded the
law. 0 9
One explanation for the radically different conclusions reached by the
majority and dissent is that each applied a different theory of statutory
interpretation. The majority opinion appears to use an intentionalist..° approach and determined at the onset that the Legislature did
not intend to punish Dixon's conduct as felony child molestation."'
The majority sought to ascertain the intent of the Legislature and then
used canons of statutory construction to support its view.'12

103. Id. at 8-9,596 S.E.2d at 151 (Hunstein, J., concurring) ("the Legislature did intend
to impose felony punishment upon sexual predators regardless of the age of the offender").
104. Id. at 10, 596 S.E.2d at 155 (Carley and Thompson, JJ., dissenting).
105. Id. (Carley and Thompson, JJ., dissenting).
106. Id. at 12, 596 S.E.2d at 156 (Carley and Thompson, JJ., dissenting).
107. Dixon, 278 Ga. at 4, 596 S.E.2d at 147.
108. Id. This seems to conflict the reasoning used earlier in the opinion that "a clear
legislative intent" existed to prosecute the conduct the jury determined to have occurred
as misdemeanor statutory rape. See Id. at 5, 596 S.E.2d at 148.
109. Id. at 9, 596 S.E.2d at 155 (Carley and Thompson, JJ., dissenting).
110. See Sawnee Elec. Membership v. Ga. Pub. Serv., 273 Ga. 702, 704, 544 S.E.2d 158,
160 (2001) (quoting City of Calhoun v. N. Ga. Elec. Membership Corp., 233 Ga. 759, 761,
213 S.E.2d 596, 599 (1975): "The cardinal rule of statutory construction is 'first, to
ascertain the legislative intent and purpose in enacting the law and then to give it that
construction which will effectuate the legislative intent and purpose.'").
111. Dixon, 278 Ga. at 5, 596 S.E.2d at 148.
112. Id.
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The majority's opinion does not hinge on the use of the rule of lenity.
Future courts likely will hold that the use of the rule of lenity was dicta
because the conviction for aggravated child molestation could have been
reversed solely on the reasoning that the Legislature did not intend to
punish Dixon's conduct as a felony." 3
The dissent used a plain meaning approach and determined that
Dixon's conduct established both statutory rape and aggravated child
molestation." 4 If a statute is clear and unambiguous on its face, a
judge adopting a plain meaning theory of statutory interpretation will
only use the text of the statute to determine how to apply the law."5
ought to apply
Here, the dissent concluded aggravated child molestation
16
because the statute itself was unambiguous.
If the majority, as the dissent argued, misconstrued the rule of lenity
and extended the rule's scope, then Dixon could have far reaching
implications. First, the dissent argued that the use of the rule of lenity
in Dixon makes the extent of injuries suffered by a victim of child
molestation irrelevant."' Thus, if a defendant was guilty of misdemeanor statutory rape, then "that is the only crime for which [the
defendant may be convicted]."" 8 This argument fails to acknowledge
that a defendant could still be charged with crimes such as rape, sexual
battery, and aggravated assault." 9
Second, expanding the rule of lenity could affect the prosecution of
other crimes. The dissent argued that under the majority's reasoning
"one whose reckless driving kills another cannot be found guilty of the
felony of vehicular homicide, because the rule of lenity limits his
culpability to misdemeanor punishment under § O.C.G.A. 40-6-390(b)."' 2 ° Additionally, others contend that the majority's use of the rule

113. See Brief for Appellants at i-iii, Dixon (No. S04A0072). Dixon's appeal contended
three separate errors supported a reversal of his conviction. The first error was based on
Legislative intent supported by the canons of statutory construction. The second error was
based on the rule of lenity. The third error was that the punishment was unconstitutionally cruel and unusual.
114. Dixon, 278 Ga. at 15, 596 S.E.2d at 153 (Hines, Carley, and Thompson, JJ.,
dissenting). See Sawnee Elec., 273 Ga. at 705, 544 S.E.2d at 161 ("The use of plain and
unequivocal language in a legislative enactment obviates any necessity for judicial
construction").
115. Sawnee Elec., 273 Ga. at 705, 544 S.E.2d at 161.
116. Dixon, 278 Ga. at 13-14, 596 S.E.2d at 152-53 (Hines, Carley, and Thompson, JJ.,
dissenting).
117. Id. at 15, 596 S.E.2d at 153 (Hines, Carley, and Thompson, JJ., dissenting).
118. Id. (Hines, Carley, and Thompson, JJ., dissenting).
119. Dixon was found not guilty of each of these crimes.
120. Dixon, 278 Ga. at 11,596 S.E.2d at 155-56 (Carley and Thompson, JJ., dissenting).
O.C.G.A. section 40-6-390(b) states that "every person convicted of reckless driving shall
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of lenity will wreak havoc within the criminal justice system by
overturning numerous convictions and changing how prosecutors charge
defendants. 121 For Dixon to have far reaching implications, courts will
have to determine that the opinion expands the application of the rule
of lenity. However, it is unlikely that courts will use Dixon to extend the
scope of the rule of lenity.
The majority's use of the rule of lenity was "due to the conflicting
However, the first section of the
nature of the two statutes."2 2
majority's opinion argued the statutes "[showed] a clear legislative intent
to prosecute the conduct that the jury determined to have occurred in
this case as misdemeanor statutory rape." 2 Dixon's appeal was based
on the argument that his conviction could be reversed by either: (1)
determining that the Legislature clearly intended misdemeanor
statutory rape to apply, or (2) if uncertainty existed then the rule of
lenity ought to apply.124 The majority opinion did not emphasize that
the rule of lenity argument was an alternative justification for reversing
the conviction.
The Motion for Reconsideration argued that applying the reasoning in
Dixon would wreak havoc within the criminal justice system because of
the improper use of the rule of lenity.125 However, this fear is likely
unfounded because the use of the rule of lenity, even if improperly
applied by the majority, was not necessary for Dixon's reversal. The
majority, after concluding the Legislature intended to punish Dixon's
conduct as a misdemeanor, stated "a number of sound legal arguments

be guilty of a misdemeanor." O.C.G.A. § 40-6-390(b) (2003).
121. Motion for Reconsideration at 11-16, Dixon (No. S04A0072); Brief of the District
Attorneys' Association of Georgia In Support of the State's Motion For Reconsideration at
14-18, Dixon (No. S04A0072).
122. Dixon, 278 Ga. at 7, 596 S.E.2d at 150.
123. Id. at 5, 596 S.E.2d at 149.
124. See Brief for Appellant at 31, Dixon (No. S04A0072) ("If this Court is not
persuaded that Misdemeanor Statutory Rape is a clear expression of the General
Assembly's intent... then it must acknowledge that the uncertainty in how the aggravated
child molestation and statutory rape statutes are to be applied here." (emphasis added)).
125. For example, one convicted of possession of marijuana with the intent to
distribute, a felony, could only be charged with a misdemeanor if he possessed less than
one ounce of marijuana because possession of less than one ounce of marijuana is a
misdemeanor. Also, before Dixon, using a weapon to rob a convenience store would lead
to a conviction of armed robbery or robbery by force. After Dixon if the amount stolen was
less than $500, then only the misdemeanor theft by taking applies. See Motion for
Reconsideration at 11-16, Dixon (No. S04A0072); Brief of the District Attorneys' Association
of Georgia In Support of the State's Motion For Reconsideration at 14-18, Dixon (No.
S04A0072).

2005]

DIXON V. STATE

support this position."'26 The use of the rule of lenity was just one of
several reasons used by the majority to support its reversal of the
conviction. The reversal was also supported by each canon of statutory
construction used by the majority. Accordingly, rather than expanding
the rule of lenity, future courts will likely determine the rule of lenity
was dicta in Dixon.
Even if the rule of lenity was critical to the holding, the majority's
reasoning would only be applicable in very limited situations. The
majority only arrived at the rule of lenity after concluding that the clear
intent of the Legislature was to punish Dixon's conduct as a misdemeanor. 2 ' In the situations suggested by the Motion for Reconsideration
and by the dissent, it is unlikely a judge would ever conclude the
Legislature intended to punish the conduct as a misdemeanor. In these
hypotheticals, the felony crime is more specific than the misdemeanor.
In Dixon the majority argued the Legislature intended to punish Dixon's
conduct as a misdemeanor because misdemeanor statutory rape
contained age requirements that made it more specific than felony child
molestation.'2
The State argued "the Supreme Court's decision in Dixon, has far
reaching implications for the prosecution of criminal cases in Geor,,129
its
While itisimpossible to fully know how the decision in Dixon
gia.
will be used in the future, it is unlikely the majority's opinion will lead
to numerous reversals of convictions or cause district attorneys to
prosecute defendants differently. It is likely that courts will interpret
Dixon in two ways: (1) that the use of the rule of lenity was dicta, or (2)
that the rule of lenity, as used in Dixon, is only applicable when the
Legislature's intent clearly shows a misdemeanor and not a felony is
appropriate.130 Those who fear that Dixon will have a much greater
impact than this Note recognizes can take comfort in knowing that the

126. Dixon, 278 Ga. at 5, 596 S.E.2d at 149.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Motion for Reconsideration at 16, Dixon (No. S04A0072).
130. Shortly before submitting this Note for publication, the Georgia Court of Appeals
examined the use of the rule of lenity in Dixon. In Webb v. State a defendant guilty of
felony child molestation and sexual battery argued that under the rule of lenity he should
only be sentenced for sexual battery, which carried less jail time than child molestation.
Nos. A04A0860, A04A0861, 2004 WL 2591257, at *2-3 (Ga. Ct. App. Nov. 16, 2004). The
court held that Dixon was not controlling and stated the rule of lenity was "among a
number of. . . reasons" used to reverse Dixon's conviction. Additionally, "[nlo uncertainty
exist[ed] concerning the applicable penal statute to be used in sentencing Webb." Id.
While Webb, like Dixon, dealt with sexual abuse statutes, it supports the view that the rule
of lenity in Dixon will not have far reaching implications.
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court has expressly asked the Legislature to weigh in on the opinion by
more clearly defining the type of conduct establishing child molestation
when misdemeanor statutory rape is involved."'
After being released from prison on May 3, 2004, Marcus Dixon signed
a football scholarship with Hampton University. He played in all of the
teams twelve games and helped lead the Pirates to a Mid-Eastern
Athletic Conference championship.
JED

131.

Dixon, 278 Ga. at 8, 596 S.E.2d at 150.
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